This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of net interest margins in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries (CESEE) during the period 1999-2009, with a particular focus on the relationship between banking sector competition and net interest margins. Using countrylevel Panzar-Rosse H-statistic estimates as a measure of competition, and the General Method of Moments, it has been determined that banking sector competition had a negative impact on net interest margins. In order to check for consistency, alternative measures of competition, such as the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, have also been used. The results appear consistent and suggest that higher market power is associated with higher interest margins.
Introduction
One of the key objectives of the transition process in the Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries (CESEE) was the establishment of sound and efficient banking sectors.
1 After a decade of substantial reforms which, among others, included the privatization of state-owned banks and the "opening-up"
to foreign bank entry, the banking sectors of the CESEE countries were able to achieve stability and improve the financial intermediation efficiency. The entry of the foreign banks was associated with the adoption of modern commercial banking practices, which led to a more prudent and efficient banking sector in all the countries. One of the standard measures of efficiency in the banking sector is the net interest margin (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999) . During the second decade of the transition process, net interest margins pursued a declining trend, but still remained at a higher level compared to the average of the euro area.
High interest margins, despite the potential positive effects for the profitability and sustainability of the banks, are viewed as signals of financial intermediation inefficiency and, as such, are considered to have a negative impact on the overall economic activity (Chortareas, Garza-García, & Girardone, 2012) . When interest margins are high, potential savers are discouraged by the low deposit rates, and credit expansion is impeded by high lending rates, thus negatively affecting investments. This is particularly important for the CESEE and other countries that lack well-functioning equity markets. In the absence of developed equity and bond markets, financing options for the enterprises are much more limited, so the economy is more dependent on the financing from the banking sector and more sensitive to banks' net interest margins.
The theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes a number of factors that are considered to have an important role in determining the level of interest margins.
One of the factors most frequently "blamed" for the high level of interest margins is the lack of competition which provides banks with price-inelastic demand and supply functions that enable them to exert market power and set higher interest margins (Ho & Saunders, 1981) . The relationship between competition and interest margins can also be viewed from the perspective of efficiency theories. Inefficient banks are predicted to set higher interest margins in order to compensate for the additional costs that arise from their cost inefficiencies.
However, banks may be able to set higher interest margins to compensate for their inefficiencies only if banking markets operate under imperfect competition, otherwise the inefficient banks would not be able to survive in competitive markets. 2 When competition increases, banks are likely to compete through their interest rates, with those applying lower interest margins being more likely to increase their market shares and survive in the market. However, banks may not necessarily be able to reduce their interest margins without enhancing their efficiency. Therefore, the increase of competition may induce banks to enhance their efficiency in order to be able to set more competitive interest margins. The discussion on the relationship between competition and efficiency was initiated by Hicks (1935) who came up with the "quiet life" hypothesis, which suggests that monopoly firms are less efficient compared to firms operating in more competitive markets. According to this hypothesis, monopoly banks' managers live a "quiet life", given that market power enables them to charge higher prices 2 The hypothesis that banking systems operate in uncompetitive markets has been confirmed by many empirical studies, including De Bandt and Davis (2000) , and Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2007) .
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Banking Sector Competition in the Panzar-Rosse Framework and Net Interest Margins: ... Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 20 : No. 1 : June 2018 : pp. 5-36 and, consequently, realize satisfactory profits without taking effort to cut their expenditures. The impact of banking sector competition on interest rate margins has also been treated in the literature addressing the link between competition and banks' risk-taking. Most of the studies in this field focus on the competition for deposits, arguing that as banks face more competition they tend to attract additional deposits by offering higher deposit interest rates in order then to be able to seize larger shares in the loans market (Keeley, 1990; Hellman, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo, 2004) . Under competitive conditions, banks will not be able to compensate higher deposit rates by increasing loan rates. Instead, banks are more likely to reduce the loan interest rates when competition increases in order to maintain/increase their shares in the loans market. As a result, the increase of competition is expected to result in lower interest rate margins. However, some authors argue that the increase of competition does not necessarily lead to higher deposit rates. According to Cordella and Yeyati (1998) , and Shy and Stenbacka (2004) , when the bank risk is observable, depositors are ready to accept even lower interest rates on their deposits from the banks that are viewed as safer in terms of asset quality. Hence, instead of competing through interest rates, banks may decide to use the quality of their assets as a strategic instrument to compete in the market for deposits.
The investigation of the determinants of interest margins, including the impact of competition, has been subject of a broad range of empirical studies. One stream of the literature has used a two-stage model which is in line with the original "dealership model" of Ho and Saunders (1981) higher competition leads to lower interest margins. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) investigated the determinants of interest rate margins in six selected EU countries and the USA for the period 1988-1995 and found that banks operating in markets that are more restricted in terms of geographic distribution in branching and universality of banking services appear to have higher interest rate spreads due to the higher monopoly power that banks may have.
Studies have mostly used market concentration indices (mainly the HerfindahlHirschman index) as a measure of competition and found a positive relationship with interest margin, suggesting that a higher degree of market concentration provides banks with a higher degree of market power which, in turn, enables them to set higher interest margins (Corvoisier & Gropp, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt, Leaven, & Levine, 2003; Peria & Mody, 2004; Gelos, 2006; Claeys & Vennet, 2008) . The use of market concentration indices as a measure of competition is based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which claims that a higher degree of concentration grants market power to incumbent firms and enables them to behave in particular ways, such as colluding with each other, which results in higher profits (Bain, 1951) . Even though largely used in the literature, market concentration indices may not represent an adequate measure of competition. Based on the efficiency structure hypothesis, developed by Demsetz (1973) , and the contestability theory, which was developed by Baumol (1982) , and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) , a higher degree of market concentration does not necessarily imply a less competitive market. 4 Hence, the relationship between market concentration and interest margins, found in the empirical studies using the market concentration as a measure of competition, may not necessarily reflect the relationship between competition and interest margins.
Few studies have used more direct measures of market power/competition, which are known as non-structural measures of competition. In this regard, Chortareas et al. (2012) , in a study covering nine Latin American countries for the period (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Schwaiger & Liebeg, 2007; Kasman, Gokce, Vardar, & Okan, 2010) .
In order to estimate the relationship between banking sector competition and interest margins in CESEE countries, this paper uses the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic which we have estimated for each country and year. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is estimated using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model (P-R model), which is a non-structural approach that measures competition by directly quantifying the conduct of firms and not taking into account the market structure. In assessing competition, the focus of the P-R model is on the competitive behavior of firms rather than on market structure. To best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in estimating the relationship between banking sector competition and interest margins for CESEE countries.
In addition, the study employs the Lerner index, which is an alternative nonstructural measure of market power. In order to make our results comparable to other studies, we run an additional regression using the market concentration index (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) instead of the competition measure.
The regression controls also for the impact of other variables, including bankspecific variables, macroeconomic variables, and institutional variables. For the dependent variable, we follow the majority of the studies in this field that use the net interest margin, which is the difference between lending and deposit rates expressed as a ratio of total earning assets. The estimation is dynamic, conducted on panel data, and uses the General Method of Moments.
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Section three describes the model. The data and methodology are presented in sections four and five, respectively. Section six presents the estimation results and section seven the conclusions.
Macroeconomic Conditions and Banking Sector Development in CESEE Countries
The poor macroeconomic environment at the beginning of the transition process that was characterized by a sharp decline of output and excessively high inflation rates represented a serious impediment to the efficient functioning of the banking system. However, the stabilization programs during the first decade of transition, which included sound monetary and fiscal policies, resulted in macroeconomic stability. The second decade of the transition process was also characterized by substantial reforms in the banking system. More specifically, this period marked a reduction in the role of the state in the banking system, the privatization of state-owned banks progressed rapidly, and the market opened up to the entry of foreignowned banks. This is the period when the banking system stability, in the sense of the banking sector being capable of withstanding the shocks and allocating the savings into profitable investment projects (European Central Bank's definition of financial stability), was more clearly achieved.
The competitive conditions in the banking sectors of the region were difficult at the beginning of the transition process. With the break-up of the mono-bank system, the banking system experienced the creation of oligopolistic market structures in most of transition economies (Papi & Revoltella, 1999) . However, the privatization process and the entry of foreign banks led to the increase of banking sector competition in these markets.
The interest rate spreads were initially high, potentially reflecting the high market power and operational inefficiencies and the other deficiencies of the operating environment. However, as the transition progressed, the interest rates followed a declining trend in all the CESEE countries ( Table 2 ). The decline is consistent with the increasing presence of foreign banks in the region which seems to have increased the degree of banking efficiency and banking system competition.
Moreover, this period was also characterized by a more favorable macroeconomic performance. The improvements in the banks' operating environment and enhanced "know-how" on the side of banks led to a reduction of non-performing loans, thus leading to lower risk premiums embedded in the interest rates.
As Table 2 shows, there are significant differences between the spreads in EU member states and other countries, with the latter having higher interest rate spreads during the whole period. However, the differences between the EU and non-EU countries appear to have narrowed in the last years. Table 3 . For the dependent variable we follow the majority of studies that investigate the determinants of interest margins by using the Net Interest Margin (NIM), which is calculated as total interest income minus total interest expenditures divided by total earning assets. Most of the studies investigating the determinants of net interest margins, based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, use the market concentration indices to control for banking sector competition.
However, given that the SCP paradigm has been heavily criticized by other theories such as the efficient structure hypothesis and the contestability theory, which claim that more concentrated markets do not necessarily reveal a higher degree of market power, it may be considered that market concentration may not represent an adequate measure of banking sector competition. Taking into account these criticisms, we consider that inferences on the relationship between competition and net interest margins derived from studies that use the degree of market concentration as a proxy for competition might be questionable.
Therefore, to control for the impact of banking sector competition on net interest margins, we use the H-statistic (h_stat1) that is produced by using the PanzarRosse approach, which directly quantifies the competitive behavior of a bank. Rosse approach has not come to a general conclusion on the choice of dependent variable in such a regression, for comparative purposes, we apply separately two 6 The P-R model produces the so-called H-statistic, which measures the sum of elasticities of bank's revenues with respect to input prices. The H-statistic indicates how bank's revenues respond to an increase of input prices and takes values from below 0 to 1. An H ≤ 0 implies that banks' competitive behavior is consistent with monopoly; 0 < H < 1 implies that banks' behavior is consistent with monopolistic competition; and H = 1 implies perfect competition. In order to verify our inferences on the impact of competition on the net interest margin, we run a separate model using the Lerner index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power. 9 The Lerner index is obtained from the study of Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) 
Data Description
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model discussed in section two and the data used for the estimation. As Table 4 shows, all the variables are continuous apart from two dummies, which stand for the ownership of the bank (i.e. foreign vs. domestic) and the origin country of the banks. From the summary statistics, it can be observed that there is sufficient variability in the data.
The bank-level data that are used in our estimation are sourced from the 
Methodology
The estimation of the determinants of net interest margins for our sample of data is conducted using the system General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator, which was initially developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . The "system" GMM estimates the model by creating a system of two equations for each time period, where one is a first-order differenced model instrumented by lagged levels as in Arellano and Bond (1991) , and the other is an equation where variables are held in their original levels and instrumented with lags of their own first differences. The reasons to use the system GMM approach include:
First, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in static, fixed effects estimation of our panel data rejects the hypothesis of no autocorrelation, hence suggesting that our model should be estimated with a dynamic approach. In order to avoid the potential endogeneity problems between the lagged dependent variable and the error term in a fixed effect model, we use the system GMM approach which overcomes this problem by using instrumental variables from within the dataset.
Second, it enables the consideration of both the time and cross-sectional variation in the model.
Third, the error term in the GMM model allows for bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Fourth, it is suitable for data sets with a large number of cross-section observations (N) and short time-series (T), which is the case with our sample.
Fifth, apart from the statistical reasons, there is also an economic rationale for using a dynamic model. The dynamic model enables us to capture the persistence of the dependent variable when there is at least some degree of continuity in the banking environment and banking behavior. The underlying reason why this is possible with a dynamic model is that the lagged dependent variable captures the entire time-path (or history) of the dependent variable. In other words, history is accounted for in a dynamic model, while it remains excluded in a static model.
In order to ensure that our model does not suffer from misspecification issues, we have run a number of diagnostic tests, including the test for the validity of instruments, the test for the cross-sectional dependence and we have also checked the size of the lagged dependent variable coefficient. All the above-mentioned diagnostic tests suggest that our model is well specified. The coefficient of the H-statistic (h_stat1) in our estimation is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level. Since we use a dynamic model to estimate the impact of competition on net interest margins, we are also able to estimate the long-run impact of competition. In the long run, the H-statistic has a coefficient of -0.66, which suggests that in the long run the impact of competition on net interest margins remains negative and the impact is larger than in the short run. The reduction of interest margins in the face of increased competition reflects the strategy of banks for increasing/maintaining their market share. In order to do so, banks may reduce their interest margins by offering higher interest rates on deposits in order to become more attractive in the deposits market and apply lower interest rates on loans in order to increase their competitiveness in the credit market. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; a) specification (1) includes the h_stat1 as a measure of competition; specification (2) includes the interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dummy variable for the non-EU countries (hstat1_dvnoneu); specification (3) includes the h_stat3 as a measure of competition; specification (4) includes the Lerner index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power; specification (5) replaces the measure of competition with the degree of market concentration (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, hhi_dep); specification (6) excludes the foreign ownership variables; specification (7) includes the interaction term between operating expenses (nonintexp_ta) and the degree of competition (h_stat1).
Source: Authors' calculations.
Since the H-statistic is an estimated variable from a first-stage regression, when used in the second-stage regression it may carry over imprecisions from the first stage. Hence, we apply the bootstrapping technique in order to correct the standard errors of the H-statistic (Table 6 ). This is a conservative approach to inference with bootstrapping typically yielding standard errors on our estimate of the H-statistic (h_stat1) that are somewhat larger than the default clusterrobust standard errors. The bootstrapped standard errors confirm our results in that the banking sector competition has a significantly negative impact on the net interest margin.
Apart from estimating the average impact of competition on the net interest margin for the overall sample, we run an additional estimation where we check whether competition in non-EU countries of our sample affects banks' net interest margins differently compared to the EU countries of our sample. Our variable of competition h_stat1 interacted with the dummy variable for the non-EU countries (dv_noneu) that takes the value of 1 when the country is not an EU member country. The interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dv_ noneu is denoted as hstat1_dvnoneu. 13 However, the coefficient of the interaction term appears statistically insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between competition and interest margins in non-EU countries of our sample does not differ significantly from the relationship in the EU countries of our sample (Table 5 , specification 2).
Apart from the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (h_stat1), we also include a number of alternative measures of competition/market power in order to check for consistency between different measures of competition.
In specification 3, as a measure of competition, we use an alternative H-statistic variable (h_stat3), which differs from h_stat1 based on the model specification that was used when this variable was estimated. 14 The estimation results appear robust, with h_stat3 having a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 10 percent confidence level, which has a similar size to the h_stat1. This might also be an important contribution to the literature using the Panzar-Rosse approach since it shows that regardless of whether the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is estimated with interest income or total income as the dependent variable, 13 The inclusion of the interaction term is done in line with Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) , who suggest that in case of multiplicative interaction models, the regression should include all the constitutive terms of the interaction term and the interaction term itself. The authors suggest that the coefficients of the constitutive terms should not be interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of one component term can be interpreted only under the assumption that the other component of the interaction term equals zero. Another model specification replaces the H-statistic with the Lerner index (lerner_index), which is a measure of market power (Table 5 , specification 4).
The coefficient on the lerner_index is positive and highly significant, suggesting that higher market power leads to higher net interest margins. This finding is consistent with our results which suggest that higher competition (i.e. lower market power) leads to lower interest margins. The robustness of our results is shown also by other control variables that retain the same sign and mostly the same level of statistical significance when using the H-statistic for the measure of competition and when using the Lerner index.
In specification 5, we replace the H-statistic with the market concentration index (hhi_dep) which is, despite many critiques in the literature, broadly used as a measure of market power. The estimation results suggest that market concentration has a positive and statistically significant impact on the net interest margin. As it can be seen from the results, the three different measures of competition, i.e. the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the market concentration index (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) have produced consistent results, which might serve as evidence in favor of the use of these variables to measure the banking sector competition.
As shown in Table 5 , the estimation results for the control variables are quite robust across different model specifications, so in the interpretation of results we will focus on our main model specification (specification 1).
The risk-aversion variable, proxied by the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta), has a positive coefficient which is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level, suggesting that bank's equity ratio plays an important role in the determination of the net interest margin. 15 According to this result, banks that maintain higher equity ratio tend to have higher net interest margins.
Since equity financing is considered to be more expensive than other forms of financing and bears a higher opportunity cost, banks tend to compensate this cost by charging higher loan interest rates (Ho & Saunders, 1981) . In addition, since more capitalized banks are considered to be safer, a higher equity ratio may enable the bank to attract deposits at a lower interest rate, which will lead to a higher net interest margin (Claeys & Vennet, 2008) .
The diversification of bank's activity, measured by the non-interest income to total assets ratio (nonintinc_ta) has the expected negative coefficient, but is charge higher loan interest rates in order to compensate for the potential losses occurring from the defaulted loans. In addition, since potential loan repayment problems usually start to take place in a later stage after the loan has been disbursed, banks facing higher credit risk tend to charge higher loan interest rates in order to collect a higher amount of interest during the period that the loan is performing which, to some extent, would compensate the losses from a potential default in the future.
The variable consisting of liquid assets expressed as a percentage of customer deposits and short-term funding (lqdassets_custstfunding), which is included in the regression to control for the opportunity cost of holding reserves, has a statistically insignificant impact. 16 This suggests that the opportunity cost of holding reserves was not significantly incorporated in banks' interest rates.
However, even though the reserves may compose a considerable part of liquid assets, the total amount of liquid assets may still not be an appropriate proxy for the reserves. Hence, this variable might not properly account for the true impact of banks' reserves on net interest margins.
The coefficient on the non-interest operating expenditures to total assets ratio (nonintexp_ta), which may serve as a proxy for the cost-inefficiency of the banks, has the expected positive sign but is statistically insignificant. Banks with higher non-interest expenses (i.e. overhead costs) would be expected to set higher interest margins in order to compensate for the higher level of their operating expenses. However, the statistically insignificant impact of this variable might be attributed to the fact that our regression controls for bank's foreign ownership whose impact on net interest margins might be to a degree channeled through the bank's cost efficiency. In order to test for this, we have run a separate regression (specification 6), in which we exclude the foreign ownership variables. After excluding the ownership variables, the coefficient of the nonintexp_ta variable becomes statistically significant and retains a positive sign, suggesting that more inefficient banks tend to set higher net interest margins in order to compensate 16 The use of liquid assets as a proxy for bank reserves has also been done by Poghosyan (2010), and Männasoo (2012) . for higher operating expenses. This finding may serve as supporting evidence to the view expressed by Poghosyan (2010) , who suggests that the control for foreign ownership may not be necessary in a dealership model, given that the channels through which foreign ownership may affect interest margins (such as efficiency and competition) are already controlled for in such models.
Supposing that the degree to which banks can compensate their cost inefficiencies by setting higher interest margins may depend on how competitive the market is, we run an alternative model specification in which we include the interaction term between the operating expenses (nonintexp _ta) and the competition variable H-statistic (specification 7). 17 The interaction term is denoted as hstat1_nonintexpta. The higher the degree of competition, the lower the expected ability of banks to transfer their cost inefficiencies into higher interest margins.
The estimation results from this model specification show that the interaction term hstat1_nonintexpta has a statistically significant negative coefficient, which suggests that the increasing impact of the operating expenditures on the net interest margin is reduced when competition increases. In other words, this finding suggests that inefficient banks are less able to charge higher interest rates when the market is competitive and, consequently, less likely to survive in a competitive market.
The model also controls for the impact of the quality of management on the net interest margin. The quality of management is proxied by the earning assets to total assets ratio (earningsassets_ta), with a higher ratio implying a better quality of management. The coefficient on the earningsassets_ta is negative and highly significant, suggesting that banks with better management quality tend to operate with lower net interest margins. The share of the deposits from banks to total customer deposits (bankdep_custdep), which is included in the regression to control for the composition of deposits, is statistically insignificant showing that the composition of deposits does not appear to be relevant for the determination of net interest margins. The Economic Freedom index (economic_freedom_hrt), which is included in the regression to control for the overall institutional environment in each country, is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level with a negative coefficient.
This suggests that countries with a higher Economic Freedom index which, among others, implies better protection of property rights and lower corruption are characterized by lower interest rate margins. A higher Economic Freedom index indicates a less uncertain operating environment for the banks, which might be reflected in lower risk premiums on the loan interest rates. The EBRD banking reform index (ebrd_bankref ) has a statistically insignificant coefficient.
Regarding the macroeconomic variables, the results suggest that the real GDP growth rate (rgdpgrowth) has a positive and highly significant impact on the net interest margin (statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level). This may be reflecting the positive impact of GDP growth on the demand for loans, which makes upward pressure on loan interest rates. A positive coefficient is also found for the GDP per capita (gdp_percap), which is included in the regression to control for the overall level of economic development in each country. Its impact on the net interest margin in principle is expected to be negative, assuming that banks operating in more developed countries face lower levels of risk and, as such, apply lower risk premiums on their loan interest rates.
The variable on the inflation rate (cpi_ebrd) turned out to be statistically insignificant, suggesting that banks' net interest margins in CESEE countries Acknowledging the importance of lower net interest margins for a more efficient financial intermediation and, consequently, better financing conditions for the economy, the findings of this paper may be considered as a suggestion directed at the authorities with hopes of enhancing the conditions for the development of healthy competition in the baking system. In addition, special attention should be given to the improvement of the different aspects of the overall operating environment, some of which have been covered in this paper. Even though our findings may suggest that the negative relationship between competition and net interest margins may serve as evidence in support of a positive link between competition and financial intermediation, further research in this
